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MEMORY AND IDENTITY

by

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ABSTRACT

If a person says "I remember breaking the school room window", it is generally believed that the person who remembers is the same person as the person who broke the window provided, of course, that the memory is verdical. The notion underlying this belief is that, in uses of first person verdical memories, the rememberer must be the same person as the person who did the remembered act. This notion I call the strong logical thesis.

In his early work, Self Knowledge and Self-Identity, Sidney Shoemaker was a strong believer in this strong logical thesis and I take his early position as representative.

David Wiggins, in Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity, produces arguments that challenge the strong logical thesis. Wiggins drives a wedge between the concepts of personal identity and memory by showing that there is not necessary connection between them. However, Wiggins follows other paths and does not explore this issue very far.

Shoemaker recognized the strength of Wiggins' arguments and, in "Persons and Their Parts", changes his position radically. He admits the possibility of the rememberer and the person who did what is remembered may not be the same person.

This is all that has to be admitted to dispose of the strong logical thesis. The new position does not bind one to producing an actual case, it is only the admittance of the logical possibility of a case. The thought experiment which Wiggins used to bring pressure on the strong logical thesis is the very farfetched suggestion of a dual brain transplant.

In spite of Shoemaker's conversion he attempts to attach some of the baggage of his early position to his later position, in particular that self-identity is immune to misidentification and that a person has special access to his own past and identity.

My main argument shows that Shoemaker is confused and confusing in his attempt. It seems that he does not make a clear distinction between constant co-occurrence and logical connection.

It is plausible to accept the later position and from it explain immunity to misidentification and access to one's past and identity as matters of fact, not matters of necessary connection.

PREFACE

In Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity, P. 139, Sidney Shoemaker writes that "it is a logical truth that, ... , if a person remembers a past event, then he, that same person, must have been in a position to have direct knowledge of that event when it occurred." At the time he wrote these words, he left us in little doubt that the person who remembers a past event must be the one and same person as the same person who directly experienced the event. Many would, I believe, agree with Shoemaker. It is the object of this thesis to determine whether the relation between memory and personal identity is as strong and close as the above quotation claims.

In later writings Shoemaker changes his mind and admits that the logical connection between remembering and personal identity is looser than he had supposed it to be. In this thesis I argue that not only is the connection looser than that expressed above, but also that Shoemaker's modified position preserves some dubious contentions which should be discarded. The contentions that first person memory reports are immune to misidentification, that self-identity is non-criterial and that a person has special access to his own identity and past will receive critical examination.

First, I attempt to clarify Shoemaker's original, stronger position and show how the three contentions are related to it. Then,

I examine a thought experiment which brings pressure on Shoemaker's original position and leads to his change of mind. The thought experiment suggested by David Wiggins, concerns the possibility of a dual transplant. Dual transplants are discussed in later chapters, but briefly they are as follows: based on the supposition that a brain can be transplanted, a dual transplant is the transplantation of a bisected brain with one half going into one body and the other half going into another body. Some time is spent showing that such transplants are plausible. In showing that the experiment is plausible I believe I drive an effective wedge between memory and personal identity. In the light of this I reconsider the contentions mentioned above. Once the position of strong connection is given up, the three contentions must also be given up. Shoemaker gives up the contention that self-identity is non-criterial but retains the other two.

In the first three chapters the original position is investigated, its relation to the three contentions clarified, Wiggins' thought experiment introduced and arguments offered for its plausibility. When I refer to Shoemaker's position in these chapters I am referring to the position as expressed at the beginning of this preface, except where I make specific mention of the revised position.

The remaining chapters examine how Shoemaker attempts to hold the contentions related to his original position after he had radically changed that position. I believe that this attempt is unsuccessful.

Finally, I offer an analysis of the relation between memory and personal identity which accommodates Wiggins' thought experiment. This analysis gives us fresh insight into the sort of immunity to misidentification that we have and the sort of access we have to our own identity and to our own past.

Before proceeding to the main body of the work there is one obvious red herring to be dispatched. There is a sense within which no one would dispute that one person can remember another's experience. For instance, one could remember another's fear. It is a common experience to notice the evidence of fear in another person and remember that person's fear. I am not interested in discussing third person remembering of this type. In this thesis the remembering discussed is first person remembering of direct experiences, i.e., a person's remembering breaking a window as opposed to a person's remembering someone else's breaking a window. In fact, the type of remembering is that in which a person remembers (himself) doing something. I object to the insertion of "himself" because it seems to prejudge a very important issue, viz., whether or not it is possible for one to remember another's experience. However, if it clarifies the sort of remembering to be discussed and it is not assumed that the insertion prejudges the identity issue, then I withdraw the objection. Shoemaker calls this sort of remembering remembering from the inside.

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CHAPTER ONE

It is clear from the quotation at the head of the preface that Shoemaker thinks, not that the person who remembers *may* be the same person as he who experienced the remembered event, but that they *must* be the same person. It is a logical truth, he claims, that they are the one and same person.

We do not have to depend on one quotation for a statement of Shoemaker's position. He makes the same strong claim in a slightly different form when he writes,

> It is self-contradictory to say I remember such and such happening, though I wasn't present when it happened and was quite unaware of its occurrence at the time.[1]

Again there is little doubt as to what is meant and as to the strength of the claim. He thinks that if there is a statement to the effect that a person remembers something then it follows, on the pain of contradiction, that the person must be the same person as the person who experienced what is remembered. It is just not possible, according to Shoemaker, to claim a memory and, at the same time, to claim not to have experienced the remembered event.

I shall now spell out Shoemaker's position in an example. Suppose an elderly man remarks, "I remember breaking the schoolroom window." According to Shoemaker the elderly man *must* be the same person as the boy who broke the schoolroom window.

In the above quotation Shoemaker says that if one claims to remember an event and, yet, says he was not present when the remembered event occurred, then he is guilty of self-contradiction. This general claim can be applied to the example just offered as follows: "I remember breaking the schoolroom window, although I was not present when it was broken and was not aware of the occurrence at the time." According to Shoemaker the speaker is contradicting himself.

What sort of contradiction is this? It is clearly not a simple "P and~P" type, otherwise the sentence uttered would be something like, "I remember breaking the window and I do not remember breaking the window." To justify his claim that there is a contradiction Shoemaker depends on "not being there" entailing that there is no remembering, i.e., he depends on his first claim that the rememberer must be the same person as he who experiences what is remembered. So, in effect, the two claims are not more than different expressions of the same claim.

Shoemaker does offer some further support for the second claim. He writes that it is the "standard sense of the word 'remember'"[2] which underpins the self-contradiction claim. However, we are not told how the standard sense of "remember" is arrived at, or where it comes from or how it might be justified. I admit immediately that I am very dubious about this sort of support. It seems to be no more than a procedure wherein one names something and then, without further elucidation or justification, uses the name to support a philosophical theory. Rather than give convincing support, this procedure invites

me to ask further philosophical questions. The main question in this instance is, "How does one arrive at the standard sense of 'remember'?"

Shoemaker uses an entailing sense of "remember"[3]. It is necessary that we distinguish between what he means here from what he means when he talks of the "standard sense." He characterizes the entailing sense as follows,

> "A remembers that P" entails "P" and "A remembers X occurring" entails "X occurred".[4]

I have no objections whatever to this entailing sense of "remember". It is exactly the sense which I use throughout this discussion. But it is very important to distinguish between, first, the sense of "remember" which entails that whatever is remembered actually occurred and, second, the sense of "remember" which entails that the person who remembers is the same person as he who had the direct experience remembered. The second sense of "remember" is the subject of the present investigation.

So far I have given two quotations from the same book to show that Shoemaker does indeed hold the strong logical position with regard to the relationship between memory and personal identity. I now give one more quotation, from a different work, to reinforce the claim that he does hold the strong position. He writes,

> For to say that a person remembers an event (and hence to say he remembers a fact about an event he remembers) normally implies that he witnessed the event, or otherwise came to know of it, at the time of its occurrence, and this implication limits the possible objects of event memory to past events and actions occurring within the lifetime of the rememberer. And of course it is only such event that one can remember having witnessed or done.[5]

Perhaps this seems less stringent than the two previous quotations, but I think this impression is erroneous and may be due to the insertion of "normally" before "implies". A little thought on the matter will show that "normally" is nothing more than a way of referring, yet again, to the standard sense of "remember". This coupled with the statement that "this implication limits the possible objects of event memory to past events and actions occurring within the lifetime of the rememberer"[6] shows that the claim expressed in this quotation is no less strong than the claim made in the first two quotations. Likewise no further elucidation or justification is offered to support it.

In the remainder of this chapter I show how Shoemaker uses his strong logical position and I elucidate, briefly, the epistemological position which underlies it. In doing this I think I am also showing the position the claim has occupied in the philosophy of personal identity and the related areas of self-knowledge, self-identity and memory since the time of John Locke. I do not argue from historical works for it is enough for the purposes of my discussion to consider only the work of Shoemaker with some passing reference to Locke.

Shoemaker writes,

> .... this problem (of self-identity) arises from philosophical views about, and philosophical perplexities about, the nature of self-knowledge, and that its solution consists mainly in the resolution of these perplexities and the correction of mistakes included in these views.[7]

The philosophical view about the nature of self-knowledge, which results from the resolution of the perplexities and correction of the mistakes, is closely related to some attendant contentions held by Shoemaker, in particular the three contentions already mentioned that self-identity is non-criterial, that first person memory statements are immune to misidentification and that a person has special access to his own past and his own identity. These will be considered at length in the course of later discussion. Here I restrict myself to making a more general point about Shoemaker's epistemological position.

From the contentions that self-identity is non-criterial and that first person memory statements are immune to misidentification it is clear that one category of knowledge, knowledge of one's own identity, is held to be very different from one's knowledge of objects such as trees, rocks, tables and chairs etc. There is the difference of how the facts used to establish self-identity are obtained. The difference, suggested by Shoemaker, and this is the difference I object to, is between knowledge of external objects which is indirect and open to mistakes and knowledge of self which is direct, in that it is non-criterial, and immune to a certain mistake, in that misidentification is impossible. Whether or not there can be indubitable and direct knowledge is an important question in epistemology and, as such, is not the business of this discussion. Certainly, if epistemologists could establish that such knowledge is a chimera, then Shoemaker would have very serious problems. It is enough for my purpose to show that self-knowledge is not direct, i.e., to show that criteria are needed to establish self-identity in the same way as criteria are needed to

establish other types of identity and also to show that it is possible to misidentify in cases of first person memory statements.

The conflict of these two epistemological positions underlies all the detailed discussion in this thesis. The confusion, which I accuse Shoemaker of engendering in his later work, stems from his blurring the distinction between the conflicting epistemological positions. The positive analysis which I offer in Chapter VI depends on showing, through the detailed arguments, that Shoemaker's epistemological stance as outlined above, is incorrect, that his revised stance is confused to the point of being useless and that my epistemological stance (which is also that of Wiggins) is as successful in the identification of self as it is in the identification of external objects.

FOOTNOTES

1 Shoemaker, Self-Knowledge, p. 136

2 Ibid., p. 136

3 Shoemaker, Self-Knowledge, p. 136/7 fn.

4 Shoemaker, Self-Knowledge, p. 136/7 fn.

5 Shoemaker, Sydney, "Memory", Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Ed. by P. Edwards, MacMillan, New York, 1967, Vol 5, p. 265.

6 Ibid., p. 136/7 fn.

7 Shoemaker, Self-Knowledge, p. vii

CHAPTER TWO

In this chapter I do two things. First, I look at the nature of the necessary connection Shoemaker asserts obtains between memory and personal identity. Second, I set out clearly some notions which are related to that connection, particularly those contentions which Shoemaker tries to retain even after he has given up the claim of logical connection between memory and personal identity.

There are several ways in which one's saying something can be contradictory. Below I take a brief look at three of these ways and state the way, which I think, Shoemaker intended his claim to be taken.

First, suppose someone says, "I cannot speak." The very act of speaking this sentence is a demonstration that what is said is false, it contradicts what is asserted in the utterance. If the statement made is to be true, then it must be false that the statement was made in speech. If the statement is false then it must be true that the person making the statement has spoken at some time or other, or is capable of speaking at some future time.

Second, suppose someone says, "I am a liar at all times." If a listener is to believe this utterance, then he must also believe it false at the same time. For instance, suppose I believe a certain Mr. Z is invariably untruthful, that all his utterances are lies. One of his utterances is, "I am a liar at all time." I believe that Mr. Z is always untruthful so I must believe that this utterance is also untrue. However the utterance expresses my belief about Mr. Z's untruthfulness.

So I am forced to the position that if I believe a certain thing about Mr. Z I must, at the same time, accept that my belief is false. Clearly this is not a tenable position. It would be self-contradictory to believe both at the same time.

Third, suppose someone says of a person, "He is a married man, but he is not married." The actual utterance of the above statement has nothing to do with the obvious difficulty found in it. Although it requires us to believe two conflicting statements, it is different from the second example above. It is different in that it is a straightforward utterance of two conflicting statements. The second example requires us to sort out the ramifications and thus reveal the paradox. Perhaps the most obvious difference between this third example and the other two is in the structure of the sentence uttered. The sentence in this third example is compound while the sentences uttered in the first two are not compound.

Shoemaker's self-contradictory example is compound also. The utterance is "I remember such and such happening, though I wasn't present when it happened and was quite unaware of its occurrence at the time." This sentence can be broken down into two sentences and it is these that Shoemaker claims is contradictory. There is on the one hand, "I remember such and such happening" and on the other hand, "I wasn't there when it happened and was quite unaware of its occurrence at the time." The latter sentence can be further divided into two sentences but this division is not important for the discussion on hand.

The most common form of self-contradictory statement is "P &~P". Shoemaker's sentence, although it is compounded from two simple sentences,

cannot be symbolized into this common form. If "P" is to stand for "I remember such and such happening" then "P" cannot also stand for "I wasn't present when it happened and was quite unaware of its occurrence at the time." Since the two sentences are not equivalent they cannot be symbolized by the same symbol.

The onus is on Shoemaker to show how the two are contradictory. It is, I think, obvious that they are not self-stultifying or paradoxical, like the first two examples above. Nor are they self-contradictory like the third example which can be symbolized as "P &~P". Nothing more is done to support his claim of self-contradiction.

In the absence of justification it is very difficult to be sure just how Shoemaker intended his logical claim to be taken. I think it very likely he is claiming that the statement "I remember" entails the statement "The experiencer and the rememberer are the same person." This is closely related to the contradiction discussed above. However, it is not very important for my purpose to decide in what way he intended the claim to be understood. It is my contention, and also one which Shoemaker accepts in his later work, that this claim is not a logical truth at all. Showing that it is not a logical truth is a task which will be tackled later.

I now turn to some of the notions related to the claim that in remembering, the rememberer and the experiencer must be the same person. There are three notions which I want to discuss, viz., that self-identity is non-criterial, that self-identity is immune to misidentification and that a person has special access to his own past and his own identity. These three are closely related as we shall see later.

The notion that self-identification is non-criterial is related to the claim of a logical connection between memory and personal identity in the following way: if in any genuine case of remembering, it is a logical truth that the rememberer and the experiencer are the same person, then once the rememberer has established that he has had a genuine memory, he needs no additional procedures to establish that the person who experienced the remembered event is himself. In other words, once an instance of memory has been established, there is no need of criteria for self-identity. There is the obvious problem, for those who subscribe to the theory of a logical connection, of establishing memory without recourse to personal identity. Much more will be said on this problem, which is in fact the Butler objection, as the thesis progresses.

The notion that self-identification is immune to misidentification is related to the logical claim in the following way: if the logical claim is true, then, in any genuine first person instance of remembering, it is not possible for the rememberer to misidentify the experiencer - they must be the same person, viz., the rememberer himself. Again there is the problem of establishing memory without recourse to personal identity.

The notion that persons have, through memory, special access to facts about their own past and their own identities is, as Shoemaker notes, a Lockean notion. Shoemaker writes,

> John Locke thought this special access important enough to warrant a special mention in his definition of "person", viz., "a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places..."[1]

This notion is related to the logical claim in the following way: if it is true that the rememberer must be the same person as the experiencer then, in any genuine instance of memory, the person who remembers is remembering his own past and is considering the experiencer as himself. The rememberer has access to his own past and his own identity through memory. Once again there is the problem of establishing memory independently of personal identity.

Attached to all three of the notions, which are briefly set out above, is the problem of establishing memory without recourse to personal identity. The problem arises when one needs to establish the personal identity of the rememberer and the experiencer in order to show that any particular instance is indeed a genuine instance of remembering. Clearly if one uses personal identity to characterize memory, then one cannot, usefully, use memory to establish personal identity. Let us call this point the Butler objection. Bishop Joseph Butler wrote,

> And one should really think it self-evident, that consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal identity;[2]

The question which arises immediately for those who hold the logical theory is, "Can memory and identity be established independently?" or at least "Can memory be established independently of personal identity?" It would seem that if one could establish memory without recourse to personal identity, then one could use memory as a useful criterion of personal identity. If one is not successful in establishing memory independent of personal identity then it is clearly circular to try to

use memory as a criterion of personal identity. So a lot hinges on the question of whether or not memory can be established without recourse to personal identity. It is one of the aims of this work to show that the two are independent, but it will be seen that this is of no use to the logical theorist.

The reason why the establishment of the independence of the two is useless to the logical theorist is that the establishment depends on the assumption that memory and personal identity are not logically related, but are independent concepts.

Within the framework of the logical theory any attempt to establish memory without recourse to personal identity is, I think, doomed. It is doomed for the simple reason that, if identity is a necessary condition of memory, then, in any particular case, one could always ask of anyone who purports to have established memory independently of personal identity, "Is it a genuine instance of memory? How can you be sure, if you do not know that the rememberer and the experiencer are the same person?"

There have been attempts to show that memory can be established without recourse to identity. Shoemaker attempted to argue, in Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity, that it is a conceptual truth that memory claims are generally true and that we can therefore be entitled to say that a person remembers a past event without already having established, or having inductive evidence, that some other criterion of personal identity (other than memory) is satisfied.

In his later work Shoemaker writes,

> This way of handling the objection no longer seems to me satisfactory.[3]

The kindest way of treating Shoemaker's argument is to accept his later denial. I have not seen any satisfactory way of establishing memory independently of personal identity when the theory of logical connection is presupposed.

In this chapter I have shown that three notions, viz., that self-identity is non-criterial, that self-identification is immune to mis-identification and that a person has special access to his own past and his own identity are related to the strong logical claim that, in a genuine case of remembering, the rememberer and the experiencer must be the same person. I have also shown that this strong logical claim is open to Butler's objection.

My position is, that if any of the related contentions are held, it must be shown that these are viable contentions and can be held even if the claim that memory and personal identity are not logically related, or, on the other hand, it must be shown how Butler's objection can be avoided. Shoemaker, in "Persons and Their Pasts" gives up the notion that self-identity is non-criterial, but he does retain both the other two. He also embraces a concept of memory which does avoid the Butler objection.

It is my contention that one must give up all three related notions along with the strong logical claim or face the full force of the Butler objection. In other words, I think that to avoid the Butler objection

the strong relation claim must be given up and I also think that when it is given up the three related notions must also be given up. Shoemaker's position and mine are obviously not compatible.

I will use the notion of dual brain transplants as a thought experiment in the rest of this thesis. Much hangs on this being a sensible notion. Before going on to the conflict between the two positions it is important to show that the notion is sensible. The next chapter presents arguments to that end.

FOOTNOTES

1 Shoemaker, "Persons", p. 269

2 Butler, Bishop Joseph, Butler's Works, ed. by R. Hon. W.E. Gladstone, Oxford, 1896, Vol. 1, p. 388

3 Shoemaker, "Persons", Footnote p. 281

CHAPTER THREE

In this chapter I turn to David Wiggins, whose work presupposes a position which is incompatible with Shoemaker's on the relation between the rememberer and the experiencer. Wiggins suggests a thought experiment which, when applied to Shoemaker's position outlined in the preceding chapters exerts pressure on that position. Shoemaker in his later work, "Persons and Their Pasts", acknowledges the power of the thought experiment and changes his position radically because of it. The extent and the effectiveness of the change is discussed in detail in Chapters IV and V. In this chapter I introduce the thought experiment that exerts pressure on Shoemaker's early position, and argue for the plausibility of the experiment.

Wiggins suggests the possibility of a person becoming two persons. He introduces the notion with a quotation from J.S. Griffith,

> ...the surgeon's knife has turned (the brain) into two independent brains and two independent consciousnesses. Both of these new brains would, presumably, remember having been the single brain which was there before.[1]

Wiggins offers an analysis of "person" which would allow Griffith's account. In brief he thinks that there is a core of matter which is the seat of the sentient functions. This core is not individuated simply as a material object. but as a piece of matter which functions in certain characteristic ways. Individuation of the core as a mere material object would not differentiate between a piece of matter from a corpse and a piece from a functioning body. If the matter must function in characteristic ways to be the sentient core of a person, then, clearly, a piece

from a corpse would not do as it could not function in any way which is characteristic of a person.

Wiggins thinks that there is no compulsion for any particular part of the body to be the sentient core, or nucleus as he calls it, though it happens to be, as a matter of fact, the central nervous system. I think that more may be involved, e.g., certain glands. The nuclear thesis is most plausible when no specific parts of the body are mentioned as candidates. For present purposes I shall assume that the nucleus is the brain and part of the central nervous system immediately ajoining it.

Shoemaker was, as far as I know, the first person to introduce the notion of brain transplantation into discussions of personal identity. He writes,

> Physiologists may have grounds for thinking that this cannot be done with human brains, but it is at least conceivable (logically possible) that a human body could continue to function normally if its brain were replaced by one taken from another human body.[2]

Coupling this with Wiggins' contention that the brain is, as matter of fact, the nucleus, we can talk sensibly of transplanting the nucleus. It is very likely that, even in his early period, Shoemaker would have objected to such talk, though it is not clear that he would have immediately agreed that transplanting the nucleus is the same as transplanting the person. It follows, ex hypothesi, that if a nucleus is transplanted, i.e., if a nucleus from Jone's body is transplanted to Smith's body, from which the nucleus has been removed, then the person who inhabited Jone's body changes places and takes up habitation in Smith's body.

For reasons of simplicity I shall not discuss any mentalist accounts of person in this thesis. I think that any general point arising from this discussion is applicable to any acceptable account personal identity. By "acceptable" I mean an account by which it is possible to individuate a person and to re-identify a person. I see no good reason why a mentalist account could not satisfy these two conditions.

Wiggins, with Griffiths' suggestion in mind, imagines a transplant in which the nucleus is split and installed in separate bodies, neither of which was the body from which the original nucleus has been removed. He further supposes that the nucleus, or brain as I have assumed to be equivalent, can be split surgically so that each half is equal to the other in functional capacities and either half is equal to the former complete nucleus in functional capacities. The most obvious way of splitting a brain is bisecting it into hemispheres. However, this would not produce the desired isomorphic units. So here I shall refer to the halves as "equispheres".[3] Wiggins is suggesting that the two equispheres, say from Jones, be transplanted, one into the Smith body and the other into the Brown body.[4]

The entity which consists of Smith's body and one equisphere from Jones is called "Smith-Jones or "S-J" for short. Similarly the other entity which consists of Brown's body and the other equisphere from Jones is called "Brown-Jones" or "B-J" for short. It is true of S-J and B-J, ex hypothesi, that they each have all the functional capacities which

Jones had had. For instance, they each would have Jones' memories.

Griffiths saw no problem in talking of remembering in his suggested case of transplanting a split brain. Nor, seemingly, did Wiggins when he wrote,

> We are supposing that the transplanted persons claim to remember exactly the same things...[5]

Admittedly, in the sentence immediately following the above Wiggins writes of "their (claimed) memories." He may be exhibiting some hesitancy with regard to the use of "memory". It is part of my task to show that such hesitancy is not called for.

It should be quite clear now where the incompatibility between Wiggin's position and Shoemaker's position lies. If Shoemaker is right, then either "remember" cannot be used when S-J and B-J recall Jone's experiences (I use recall to try to avoid prejudice), or if "remember" is permitted as legitimate then S-J and B-J must be the same person, or personal identity is not a transitive relation. The last two options follow from Shoemaker's strong logical claim. The only way to avoid embracing them is to take up the first option, viz., that "remember" is being used incorrectly.

Do we have to avoid taking the last two options? I think that they are both untenable and can be shown to be so.

When Shoemaker's strong logical position is presupposed, then, in any genuine case of remembering, the rememberer and the experiencer must be the same person. If the word "remember" is used correctly with regard

to S-J's and B-J's recalling of Jones' experience then S-J and B-J must be the same person as Jones. However, by transitivity of identity, if S-J is the same person as Jones and Jones is the same person as B-J then S-J must be the same person as B-J. It may well be that S-J and B-J lead entirely different lives, they may not know of the other's existence. If they would happen to meet, as Wiggins points out, they would communicate interpersonally. They would, in fact, be completely separate persons. There seems no hope of supporting a claim that they are one and the same person.

On the other hand the above difficulty would not arise if personal identity was not a transitive relation. Then it could be safely claimed that S-J and B-J are, each, the same person as Jones, but as the relation is not transitive, there is no reason to say that S-J and B-J are the same person. The transitivity of personal identity is an instance of the transitivity of identity in general. Transitivity of identity is a very familiar pattern of reasoning and to dispense with it would deplete our stocks of reasoning procedures. For instance, we often argue in the following vein: the child is the same person as the youth and the youth is the same person as the old man, therefore the child is the same person as the old man. The same pattern is used for material objects, numbers etc. This is a familiar and universally accepted form of argument and I can see no possible reasons for rejecting it and it does depend entirely on transitivity of identity.

It may be suggested that instead of rejecting transitivity in general it could be argued that perhaps personal identity is not a transitive

relation. I see no reason for making any difference between personal identity and other forms of identity. The fact that the objects dealt with are persons seems to be irrelevant.

If anyone wishes to reject transitivity of identity either identity in general or in personal identity then the onus is on them to produce supporting arguments. I know of none. To merely point out that it gives rise to problems in the above case and therefore we should reject it begs the question and bars investigation into the important reason for the problems.

Is it possible that Shoemaker is right in claiming "remember" is being used incorrectly? This is certainly a possibility. However to insist on it being an incorrect usage simply because the use of the word in cases where the rememberer and the experiencer are not the same person gives rise to problems again begs the question. It is very important for my discussion that this question is not begged and that a analysis of problem be undertaken. Shoemaker does not support his claim that the word is being used incorrectly and I think he is guilty of begging the question and covering the real problem and possible solution.

The reason for the hesitancy or downright refusal to use "remember" in cases where the rememberer and the experiencer may not be the same person springs directly from a belief in the correctness of the strong logical position, in other words in the belief that it is a logical truth that we can only remember our own experiences.

The hesitancy and the reason for it comes out in the following quotation from the work of another contemporary philosopher. Derek Parfit writes,

> It may be a logical truth that we can only remember our own experiences. But we can frame a new concept for which this is not a logical truth. Let us call this q-memory.[6]

Parfit does not show the same strong belief in the strong logical position as Shoemaker does, but he thinks it is required that a "new concept" be framed to handle the case where we wish to talk of remembering in an instance where the rememberer and the experiencer is not the same person. It is my contention that there is no need to frame a new concept for our present concepts of memory and personal identity are not logically related in the way Shoemaker thinks they are.

This completes the presentation of Wiggins' thought experiment. It is now clear that there is a conflict between Shoemaker's position and Wiggin's position. Shoemaker, in "Persons and Their Pasts", recognises the conflict, realises the pressure that Wiggins' thought experiment applies against him, so he accordingly makes an extensive adjustment to his own position. I now go on to show how the thought experiment exerts the pressure which leads to the change.

Shoemaker, believing, as he does at this stage, in the strong logical position, claims that the rememberer and the experiencer must be the same person in any genuine case of first person remembering. Wiggin's thought experiment presented him with a difficulty in that if he allowed that "remember" is used legitimately then he had the option of holding any one of two positions, both of which I have argued above

are untenable. Or he has the other option of claiming that "remember" is used illegitimately. So the thought experiment forces Shoemaker to attempt to occupy one of these three positions. He does not seem to consider the two which I rejected. As we follow the progress of the change in his basic position, as I outline it in Chapter IV, we can see him realize that his claim of illegitimate use of "remember" is difficult to hold and he gradually changes his basic position on the strong logical thesis to allow his giving up the claim. So the thought experiment exerts pressure at the point where he claims that where the rememberer and the experiencer are not the same person the word "remember" is used incorrectly. In his early work this claim simply begs the question. He offers no support for it whatsoever. In his later work he seems to realize that there are no good reasons for refusing the use of "remember" in the circumstances and so the basic position is changed to accommodate this realization. My objection to his latest position is that he does not seem to realize how radical the change has to be and the effect that the change must have on the related contentions, in particular on the contentions that self-identity is immune to misidentification and that a person has special access to his own past and his own identity.

It is very important that the thought experiment can be shown to be plausible. It has been presented above and there is nothing there which is obviously inconsistent. I now show that there is nothing inconsistent in the experiment. To do this I shall use two imaginary cases. There are, of course, no actual cases.

The first of these imaginary cases is the one already mentioned, that of surgical bisection of the brain and the second is the imaginary case of a person born with two brains. Neither is likely to occur. The fact that both are highly improbable does not count against the plausibility of the thought experiment. All that is required of them is that they are conceptually possible.

When Shoemaker first introduced the notion of brain transplantation into the discussion of personal identity he was probing the respective roles of psychological and physical criteria in personal identity.[7] That inquiry has little relevance to this discussion. All I wish to do here is to point out that Shoemaker thought brain transplantation a plausible notion.

It was supposed, in laying out the nucleur theory of persons that the brain was the nucleus. Coupling this supposition with the possibility of brain transplantation would give a case of nucleus transplantation. If a nucleus is transplanted then, ex hypothesi, the person swaps bodies. Thus, if the brain is removed from the Jones body and installed in the brainless Brown body the person, Jones, swaps bodies.

The person who inhabits the Brown body after the operation can be re-identified as the same person as inhabited the Jones body before the operation. We can re-identify this person because it is possible to trace the continuity of a certain essential thing, the nucleus. The nucleus happens to be the brain and so the continuity of the physical entity can be traced. The possibility of a brain transplant coupled with the nucleus permits us to talk sensibly of a person swapping bodies.

It should be noted that the person before the operation is not identified with the person after the operation because of any resemblance which the two have. There would be close resemblance in the functioning of the two, but because of the different bodies there would be no physical resemblance, e.g., their fingerprints would be different. They are identified because the required continuity can be traced from one to the other. In our everyday world we do use resemblances to help us in re-identification. Fingerprints are accepted as very good evidence. Fingerprints rely on, for their elevated evidential position, the very high improbability of there being duplicates, but not on the logical impossibility of their being duplicates. To elevate resemblance from being a very useful, and seldom misleading, rule of practical procedure to a philosophical analysis of re-identification would require that we lose the distinction between copy and original. To take a fairly exotic example: suppose a machine, a computer, was constructed and programmed so that it could answer successfully any question put to it in exactly the same way as a certain Mr. X would answer it. The machine would not resemble Mr. X physically. Now suppose Mr. X's brain is irreparably damaged, surgically removed and the body attached to the machine. The machine can duplicate all Mr. X's brain functions. Would we say that, because of the resemblance, the person attached to the machine (assuming that we would even agree to call the entity a person) is the same person as Mr. X? My inclination would be to say that it is a copy of Mr. X. I say this because there is no continuity between Mr. X's nucleus and the machine which replaces it. Consider further what would happen if

several of these machines were to be constructed. Clearly there is no limit to the number of copies which can be made, but there can only be one instance of the same thing.

So it is plausible to talk of a person swapping bodies through brain transplantation. At this point Wiggins makes a further supposition. He supposes that the brain can be divided into two equipolent parts, which I have called "equispheres." We have just seen how the transplantation of a complete nucleus is sensible. It remains to show that it makes sense to talk of splitting the nucleus.

Griffith mentioned the possibility of bisecting the brain by a surgical operation, so that each segment is equal to the other in all its functional capacities and each of them is also equal to the complete brain. Although what we do know about the brain indicates that it may not be divisible in such a manner, there seems to be no logical reason why we cannot suppose that the brain is so divisible. This supposition is sensible and it is all that is required for us to proceed with the thought experiment.

I think that more can be done to strengthen the plausibility of a dividing nucleus. The suggestion I now make is at least slightly more plausible than the notion of surgical bisection.

Most of us are familiar with the fairground sideshows which exhibit calves with five legs or chickens with three. Not all of these oddities are frauds; there are some well authenticated cases of such abnormalities. Likewise it is not unknown for a person to be born with six fingers or six toes. It has also been known for persons to have internal organs duplicated. It is no great step from this to imagine a person born with

two brains.

We have to imagine that this person used both brains which were connected to the body in the same way. Both brains would receive the same input and both would produce the same output. In other words the two brains would work in tandem. They would be equal to each other and each separate one would be equal to the two together in their functional capacities. Each separate brain would be the equivalent of an equisphere.

To complete the imagined case we need to suppose a surgical operation in which the two brains are extracted from the original person and transplanted into two separate bodies. For example, suppose Jones was the person born with two brains. For some good medical reason it is decided that his brains are available for transplanting. The double brain is removed and one of the brains is installed in the Smith body and the other in the Brown body. This would give us S-J and B-J just as in the bisection example.

On the strength of the supposition that the brain is, in fact, the nucleus, then when the brain is transplanted the functional capacities are also transplanted. On the further assumption that the two brains in Jones were equipolent and fully functional, then full functional capacity is transplanted with each of them. For example, Jones' memories would be transplanted with his brains. Each separate brain would have the full complement of memories and so Smith-Jones and Brown-Jones would each have a full complement of Brown's memories (assuming I can safely refer to S-J's and B-J's memories).

All I wish to do at this stage is to point out that there is nothing conceptually inconsistent about the notion of dual transplants and we can sensibly talk of one person becoming more than one.

Before moving on to the next chapter I wish to note that there is another side to dual transplants. The dual transplant is an example of fission, but there is also the possibility of fusion - the transplanting of two equispheres from different donors into a single body. This is the fission case in reverse and as such introduces no new aspects into the thought experiment. From here on I shall ignore it.

FOOTNOTES

1 Wiggins, Identity, p. 52

2 Shoemaker, Self-Knowledge, p. 22f

3 I am obliged to John King-Falow for suggesting this term

4 The system of naming is borrowed from John Perry. See Perry, John, "Can the Self Divide?", The Journal of Philosophy LXIX No. 16, 7/9/72, p. 463.

5 Wiggins, Identity, p. 53

6 Parfit Derek, "Personal Identity", Philosophical Review, January, 1971, p. 14

CHAPTER FOUR

So far I have presented Sidney Shoemaker's position as set forth in his early work. There he thought that it is a logical truth that the rememberer and the experiencer must be the same person in instances of first person remembering. I have also presented David Wiggin's position and have shown it to be incompatible with Shoemaker's. The inconsistency lay in that Wiggins talked of remembering where the rememberer and the experiencer were not the same person, whereas Shoemaker said such use of "remember" was incorrect.

I have already indicated that Shoemaker, in "Persons and Their Pasts", changes his basic position. This, it might seem, makes discussion of this earlier position unimportant. This is not so, for, although he changes his position, he does try to retain two of the three contentions directly associated with his early position. In this chapter I show why he gives up the contention that self-identity is non-criterial. I make clear the role the Butler objection plays in personal identity. I then take another look at the two contentions, which Shoemaker retains, viz., that first person memory statements are immune to misidentification and that a person has special access to his own past and identity. Finally I draw a distinction, which is very important in the discussion of immunity to misidentification, between de jure immunity and de facto immunity.

Shoemaker gives up the contention that self-identity is non-criterial.

He writes,

> Thus the question of whether the knowledge of our own identities provided us by memory is essentially non-criterial turns on the question of whether it is possible to quasi-remember past actions and experiences without remembering them.[1]

"Quasi-remembering" is a sense of remembering that does not entail having experienced the remembered event (see Chapter V for a discussion of this sense). In "Persons and Their Pasts" Shoemaker decides that it is possible to quasi-remember past actions and experiences without remembering them, i.e., without remembering them in the sense that the remember must be the same person as the experiencer.

If it is possible to quasi-remember events as well as to remember them, then there must be some procedures for deciding whether one is remembering or quasi-remembering. The distinction rests on whether the remember can identify the experiencer as himself or as someone else. This amounts to admitting that when our knowledge of the past is supplied by memory, then we cannot take the step to self-identity immediately, i.e., without further consideration of criteria, but must go through a decision procedure to determine whether we have a case of memory or quasi-memory. In fact, once it is admitted that quasi-memory is a possibility then one should, in theory, determine the identity of the experiencer and to do this one would have consider some sort of criteria of identity. So Shoemaker gives up the contention that self-identity is non-criterial.

Although Shoemaker gives up the contention that self-identity is non-criterial, he endeavours to retain the other two contentions related to his strong logical claim. He tries to retain immunity to misidentification

with some qualifications to immunity, and the contention that a person has special access to his own past and his own identity in the strong sense. There is much discussion of "strong sense" in Chapter VI.

I argue that Shoemaker cannot retain these two contentions, in any useful form, once he gives up the strong position on the necessary identity of the rememberer and the experiencer. In Chapter II I referred to the Butler objection. The objection applied its force against the strong logical claim that the rememberer must be the same person as the experiencer. If the strong logical position is given up then the Butler objection loses its force. Shoemaker wants to avoid the Butler objection and, at the same time, wants to retain the two contentions mentioned above. There is an inconsistency in Shoemaker's attempt to balance the two. The attempt could only be successful at the expense of a radical change in the two contentions.

In "Persons and Their Pasts" Shoemaker gives a good characterization of the Butler objection. He writes,

> ... the formula "If S remembers E, S is identical with someone who witnessed E" will be circular if offered as a partial analysis of the concept of personal identity.[2]

Clearly if it is a condition of S's remembering E that S is identical with a witness of E, them memory cannot be used to establish the identity of S with that witness. It cannot be used simply because the identity of S with the witness of E must be established prior to the characterization of the memory as genuine.

Perhaps something could be salvaged if memory could be established independently of identity. This has proven to be a difficult undertaking. Shoemaker fully realized the problem in Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity and he tried there to solve it. There is no need to examine that attempt for he writes of it in "Persons and Their Pasts",

> . I attempted to reduce the force of this objection by arguing that it is a "conceptual truth" that memory claims are generally true, and that we can therefore be entitled to say that a person remembers a past event without having established, or having inductive evidence, that some other criterion of personal identity (one not involving memory) is satisfied. This way of handling the objection no longer seems to me satisfactory.[3] (my italics)

"Conceptual truth" is no more than an evasion of a difficult problem, but I know of no effort which is any more plausible.

I am, in fact, suggesting that Butler's objection cannot be overcome while the strong logical position is held. On the other hand, if strong logical position is rejected and it is thought that the rememberer and the experiencer need not be the same person, then the problem disappears. The problem disappears because memory is no longer characterized by the identification of the rememberer and the experiencer. Thus it should, in theory, be possible to characterize memory and identity separately.

Once it is realized that memory and identity are not logically related, that it is possible to characterize them separately, then it becomes clear that Butler's objection has no force. Shoemaker, to avoid Butler's objection, accepted that it is possible that there may be memory even when the remember and he who experienced what is remembered are not the one and same person. To accept this possibility is a radical change of position from that held in his earlier work.

By changing his position Shoemaker has resolved a difficulty which seemed to be insoluble when viewed from his former stance. However, he still wants to retain the two contentions which we have seen are closely related to that former stance.

Shoemaker still wants to claim that self-identification is immune to misidentification. It would be appropriate here to enter a short discussion misidentification before proceeding to an important discussion of immunity.

In "Persons and Their Pasts", Shoemaker offers the following illustrative case.

> Consider a case in which I say, on the basis of my memory of a past incident, "I shouted that Johnson should be impeached," and compare this with a case in which I say, again on the basis of my memory of a past incident, "John shouted that Johnson should be impeached."[4]

As Shoemaker points out, I could have a full and accurate memory of the latter event and yet misidentify the person who shouted. It could well be that, at the time of the incident, I was mistaken in thinking that it was John who had shouted. It is possible that it was someone very like John who had shouted, perhaps even an identical twin, and this had caused me to make a mistake. Clearly my memory could be perfect with regard to the incident and yet I would continue to make the mistake over the identity of the person who had shouted.

In the instance of "I shouted that Johnson should be impeached" the same sort of mistake is not possible. My memory could be faulty and I could think now that I shouted when I did not, but I could not have

a perfect memory of the event and be mistaken over who had shouted. I could not have been mistaken over who had shouted at the time of the incident for it was I who had shouted. It would not have been possible for me to misidentify the shouter on the grounds that he looked like me. The immunity to misidentification stems from two things. There is first, the fact that, at the time of the incident, the shouter is not capable of misidentifying himself. Second, if the rememberer remembers himself doing something then he must be the same person as the agent, in this example the shouter. The second basis for immunity depends on the holding of the strong logical position. Shoemaker, in his later work does not want to rely on the strong logical thesis, but he does want to use the distinction between the two types of misidentification. His use of the distinction is discussed in Chapter VI.

In his attempts to retain the contention that self-identity is immune to misidentification, Shoemaker modifies his notion of immunity. Evaluation of the modification is also discussed in Chapter VI. Here I now draw a distinction which is required for that discussion. It is of the utmost importance that this distinction be very clear.

There are two kinds of immunity. Shoemaker calls one kind "de facto" and I follow him in this. The other kind I call "de jure".

The following example will help to clarify de jure immunity. In the Middle Ages churchman, i.e., priests, monks and various other church dignitaries could not be prosecuted under Common Law. If they were accused of a crime prosecution was undertaken in the church courts. The churchmen were not under the jurisdiction of the Common Law, but were subject to

Church Law. If a churchman was taken before a Common Law court he was being deprived of a right and, in fact, the proceedings were illegal. The immunity from Common Law enjoyed by churchmen was written into the Law and was not simply a matter of fact that churchmen were tried before Church courts. While the Law was unchanged, it was illegal to try churchmen before Common Law courts.

De facto immunity is entirely different. The following example illustrates it. If a child had once had chicken pox it is considered unlikely that he will contact the disease again. The child is said to be immune to the disease. However, it is possible for a child to take chicken pox twice, though such cases are relatively rare. Although on the second infection doctors would not refuse to diagnose the ailment as chicken pox simply because the patient has had chicken pox previously, they would be very careful with their diagnosis for the rarity of re-occurrence would influence them. There is nothing impossible about re-infection as there is about a churchman being tried before a Common Law court. The churchman would not be getting tried at all, but would be the subject of illegal proceedings. The re-infected patient would simply be one of the unfortunate few who had contacted the disease twice.

The distinction between the two sorts of immunity emerges above. It is impossible to violate de jure immunity, whereas with de facto it is not impossible though often highly improbable that it is broken.

Shoemaker qualifies his claim that self-identification is immune to misidentification by switching the type of immunity from de jure to de facto. He did not call his original immunity de jure, but it is clear that the

immunity mentioned in his early work was de jure.

Shoemaker's qualification is discussed at length in Chapter VI. I now move to the other contention that he wishes to retain after giving up the strong thesis, viz., that a person has special access to his own past and his own identity.

Shoemaker characterizes special access by expressing it in two related claims. These are, first, "It is a necessary condition of its being true that a person remembers a given event that he, that same person, should have observed or experienced that event".[5] The second claim is, "that an important class of first person memory claims are in a certain respect immune to what I call 'error through misidentification'".[6] Neither of these two claims is unfamiliar to us by now. The first is the strong logical position and the second is the claim of immunity to misidentification just discussed above. When special access is mentioned first in "Persons and Their Past" there is no doubt that he means it to be characterized in a very strong sense. Although me modifies the two claims by which he characterizes it during the course of the essay, in the last paragraph he writes,

> ... and thus that there is special access in the strong sense characterized in Sect. 1.[7]

There is therefore some difficulty in following what Shoemaker means by that remark in the last paragraph. It seems clear that if the two claims which characterize special access are modified then special access is also modified accordingly. I do not think he can justify such a strong claim of special access after his modification of the two characterizing claims and argue this in Chapter VI.

FOOTNOTES

1 Shoemaker, "Persons", p. 272

2 Ibid., p. 281

3 Ibid., p. 281, footnote 23

4 Ibid., p. 269

5 Ibid., p. 269

6 Ibid., p. 269

7 Ibid., p. 285

CHAPTER FIVE

In this chapter I lay out Shoemaker's analysis of memory and identity. Shoemaker distinguishes two types of memory. One type is that in which the rememberer and he who experienced what is remembered are the same person. Shoemaker calls this the "strong sense" of remembering and labels it "remembering$_s$". On the other hand when there is no requirement as to the identification of the rememberer and the experiencer the sense of remembering is called the "weak sense" and is labelled "remembering$_w$".

The relative strength of the senses of remembering depends on what previous awareness condition is satisfied. Shoemaker writes,

> ... the strength of the sense depends on the associated previous awareness condition.[1]

Shoemaker specifies the previous awareness condition for the strong sense of memory, memory$_s$, as follows,

> It is a necessary condition of its being true that a person remembers a given past event that he, that same person, should have observed or experienced that event, or known of it in some other direct way, at the time of its occurrence.[2]

The weak sense of remembering, remembering$_w$, requires more specification than the strong sense. To help understand it a series of characterizations must be given.

The first characterization is of a very weak sense which Shoemaker calls "quasi-memory". He writes,

> What we need to consider is whether there could be a kind of knowledge of past events such that this sort of knowledge of an event does not involve there being a correspondence between his present cognitive state and a past cognitive and sensory state that was of the event, but such that this correspondence, although just like that which exists in memory, does not necessarily involve that past state's having been a state of the very same person who subsequently has the knowledge.[3]

Clearly quasi-memory would not satisfy the previous awareness for remembering$_s$. Shoemaker puts it as follows,

> Whereas someone's claim to remember (i.e., remember$_s$) a past event entails that he himself was aware of the event at the time of its occurrence, the claim to quasi-remember an event only entails that someone or other was aware of it.[4]

This is a very weak sense of remember. I doubt that it has any utility. If it was taken as our ordinary sense of remember the distinction between genuine instances of memory and copies of genuine instances of memory would be lost.

Shoemaker introduces a notion which does differentiate between memory performances and exact replicas. He writes,

> I am going to assume, ... , that is part of the previous awareness condition for memory that a veridical memory must not only correspond to, but must stand in an appropriate causal relationship to, a past cognitive and sensory state of the rememberer.[5]

I agree that some such requirement is needed, but I accept that it is causal only with reluctance.[6]

Having assumed that the causal requirement is an essential part of the previous awareness condition for the strong sense of remembering,

Shoemaker then considers introducing it into the previous awareness condition for quasi-remembering. He writes,

> But now we must consider the consequences of strengthening the previous awareness condition for quasi-remembering to include the requirement that a veridical quasi-memory must not only correspond to, but also must stand in an appropriate causal relation to, a past cognitive and sensory state of another.[7]

The point I have made previously about differentiating between actual memory performance and exact copies of memory performances is brought out in the above quotation. Shoemaker insists that the cognitive state at the time of remembering must correspond to the cognitive or sensory state at the time of the experience. An exact copy would simulate the sensory or cognitive state and thus satisfy the previous awareness condition for quasi-memory. The addition of the causal requirement to this previous awareness condition gives a test whereby one can distinguish between replica and genuine memory performances.

Shoemaker calls the type of memory after the addition of the causal requirement to quasi-remembering "quasi$_c$-remembering". He writes,

> I shall use the expression "quasi-remember" and "quasi$_c$-memory" when speaking of the sort of quasi-remembering whose previous awareness condition includes the causal requirement.[8]

Quasi$_c$-remembering is the weak sense of remembering which Shoemaker calls "remembering$_w$".

The distinction between remembering$_s$ and remembering$_w$ depends on which of the previous awareness conditions are satisfied.

Offering these two senses of memory may seem, at first sight, a reasonable way of analysing the relationship between memory and identity.

I shall argue that it is not a satisfactory analysis. It engenders undue confusion without giving any satisfactory answers.

Here I say a little about what I find confused. Shoemaker introduces the strong sense of remember without reference to the weak sense. Without contrast with the previous awareness condition for the weak sense the previous awareness condition for the strong sense seems to be a restatement of the strong logical position of his earlier work. It is probably not Shoemaker's intention to allow Section I of his paper to be taken separately from the rest of his work, but if one were to do this, then it is reasonable to think that the previous awareness condition for the strong sense is a restatement of the strong logical position. However, if the previous awareness condition is taken in the context of the paper, (i.e., along with the possibility of there being a weaker sense of remembering), it is clearly not a restatement of the strong position. There would be less confusion is Shoemaker would let the matter rest there, but he does not. He writes in the very last paragraph of "Persons and Their Pasts",

> In the actual world it is true both that remembering$_w$ is always remembering$_s$ (and thus there is special access in the strong sense characterized in Sect. I),...[9]

Does Shoemaker mean here that, because in the actual world remembering$_w$ is always remembering$_s$ (which is true assuming for the moment that I accept the double analysis of memory) that the strong logical thesis is somehow reinstated? I find this confusing. He does not say it is a re-instatement, but if we take Sect. I in isolation then the previous awareness condition for the strong sense appears to be just that. Another inducement too in thinking in this way is that the second part of the characterization of

special access in Sect. 1 is the clear use of de jure immunity which depends entirely on the strong logical position as I later show. I simply note the confusion here, but do nothing to sort it out. I do not think it is possible to sort it out from the text of "Persons and Their Pasts".

As well as analysing memory into two senses, Shoemaker recognizes the possibility of a dual transplant. He introduced the causal relationship into the previous awareness condition for the weak sense of remembering. He proposes to call this causal relationship an "M-type causal chain". He writes,

> .... , I shall refer to the sort of causal chain which must link a quasi-memory with a corresponding past cognitive and sensory state if they are to be "of" the same event, or if the former is said to be "of" the latter.[10]

He then considers what happens if M-type causal chains should happen to branch. This would give the position where,

> ... , two or more simultaneously existing total states are M-connected. Here we cannot claim that if the two total mental states are M-connected they are thereby copersonal without committing ourselves to the unattractive conclusion that a person can be in two different places, and can have two different total mental states, at one and the same time.[11]

This is, of course, the dual transplant story in different words. It is complete here with the problem of whether or not the two off-spring are, both, the same person as the original and as each other. Shoemaker follows Wiggins exactly for a solution. Just as Wiggins had a prohibition against splitting and fusing, Shoemaker has a prohibition against M-type causal chains branching.

In accepting Wiggins' thought experiment, Shoemaker is accepting a

basic position which, as we have seen, is incompatible with the strong logical position of his earlier work. This is his radical change which I have talked about. However, I have noted immediately above that there is some confusion with regard to his actual stance in "Persons and Their Past". I think that the confusion cannot be resolved. In the next chapter I look at his attempts to accommodate a solution to Butler's objection, immunity to misidentification in self-identity and special access all at the same time within the one basic position. I do not think that these three can be accommodated within the one framework. Shoemaker's attempt to accommodate them leads to confusion.

FOOTNOTES

1 Shoemaker, "Persons", p. 281

2 Ibid., p. 269

3 Ibid., p. 271

4 Ibid., p. 272

5 Ibid., p. 272

6 Shoemaker writes that "a veridical memory...must stand in an appropriate causal relationship to, a past cognitive and sensory state of the rememberer". The reluctance with which I accept the causal relationship as a requirement stems from Shoemaker's insistence that it is a must. I follow Wiggins and think that the requirement is perserverance or persistence of the entity. With the correct qualifactions a causal relationship would guarantee persistence, but there are other possibilities of persistence being guaranteed. There is no need to enter this lengthy discussion here. It is enough for me to accept the causal relationship with the reservations that it may not be wide enough and that it needs to be closely specified to guarantee persistence.

7 Shoemaker, "Persons", p. 277

8 Ibid., p. 278

9 Ibid., P. 285

10 Ibid., p. 278

11 Ibid., p. 279

CHAPTER SIX

In this chapter I present my arguments against Shoemaker. There are three main points to deal with. First, there is the attempt to avoid the Butler objection. Second, there is the claim that self-identification is immune to misidentification. Third, there is the claim that a person has special access to his own past and own identity. For reason of clarity, I divide this chapter into sections to correspond to the above three main points.

I.

Shoemaker presented the Butler objection very well when he wrote,

> ... the formula "If S remembers E, S is identical with someone who witnessed E" will be circular if offered as a partial analysis of personal identity.[1]

He then presents us with the solution to the problem,

> Such objections assume that remembering involves the satisfaction of the strong previous awareness condition, and they can be avoided on the assumption that the previous awareness condition is weaker than this, e.g., is that given for quasi$_c$-remembering ...[2]

In his solution Shoemaker admits the difficulty which Butler's objection held for his strong previous awareness condition. I am assuming that the strong previous awareness condition is the equivalent of the strong logical position. In other words, I am taking Sect. I of "Persons and Their Pasts" out of the context of the later qualifications. However, if one takes the strong previous awareness condition of remembering in

the context of remembering$_w$, Butler's objection has not the force noted above.

When it is assumed there might be the two senses of "remember" Butler's objection still counts in a subtle way against the strong sense. In this instance it is possible to establish memory independently of identity. When assuming the strong logical position it was not possible to establish memory independently of identity. When memory$_w$ is assumed it can be established independently of identity. However, when memory$_s$ is assumed then it has already been established that the rememberer and the experiencer are the same person.

I would have no objection if memory$_s$, was simply a descriptive term for the cases where it happens to be a fact that the rememberer and the experiencer are the same person. But if the term is used for anything more than that, then Butler's objection works against it. If it is thought that remembering$_s$ can play a part in the characterizing of identity, the problem arises, but in a slightly different form from that which it took against the strong logical position. There it highlighted a vicious circularity. In this case it points to a triviality. Remembering$_s$ is remembering$_w$ plus the fact that the rememberer and the experiencer are the same person. So if remembering$_s$ is used to characterize identity then it is clearly trivial to use a concept in which it has already been shown that the experiencer and the rememberer are the same person. There is no question here of a vicious circularity, it is recognized that identity and memory are separate concepts and can be established independently. It is merely trivial. Butler's objection has never been used against such a

concept before, but the way the objection of triviality works is so similiar to the way Butler's objection works against the strong logical position that I feel it is that objection in another form.

Shoemaker does claim that remembering$_S$ is more than a descriptive term. He writes,

> ... we can still assert as a logical truth that if S remembers event E (or remembers action A from the inside) and if there has been no branching of M-type causal chains during the relevant stretch of S's history then S is one of the witnesses of E (is the person who did A).[3]

I shall argue below that Shoemaker is here characterizing remembering$_S$ and he is making yet another claim to logical truth. Assuming for the moment the success of my argument that the above is a characterization remembering$_S$, it could be nothing else but a logical truth. However, it is trivial in the extreme, being the sort of truism which Butler's objection throws light on and which I noted above.

I have to show that the above quotation is a characterization of remembering$_S$. Remembering$_S$ was remembering$_W$ plus the fact that the rememberer and the experiencer were the same person. It is a necessary condition remembering$_S$ that the person who remembers would have experienced the remembered event. In the quotation above, remembering$_W$ is linked to the condition that there is no branching of M-type causal chains. Does the fact that the M-type causal chains do not branch amount to saying that the rememberer and the experiencer are the same person?

David Wiggins spells out in considerable detail conditions which should be satisfied for a thing to remain the same thing over a period of

time. There is not space here to give Wiggin's theory in full[4], but I offer a brief outline which, I think, is sufficient for my purposes.

Wiggins' chief requirement of identity is continuity or, as I have called it, persistence. Imagine a ball of clay which I drop onto the floor and flatten into a disc. I take up the disc and roll it into a ball again. Is the second ball the same ball as the first? It is not. It is, of course, the same clay, but not the same ball of clay. There was a period when no ball was in existence and the clay was in the form of a disc. Because of the discontinuity when the clay was crushed into a disc we cannot claim the ball before the crushing is the same ball as the ball after the crushing. The fact that both balls were constituted from the same clay has no bearing.

M-type causal chains ensure persistence. Wiggins has two other important conditions.[5] These are the conditions that the continuity shall not divide nor fuse. If the continuity branched then one would become more than one, i.e., the dual transplant case. If the continuity fused with another line of continuity then two would become one. These give rise to the problems discussed under dual transplants. Branching for Shoemaker covers both fission and fusion. His prohibition against branching disallows either of the two.

So when Shoemaker gives the condition that M-type causal should not branch he is giving the conditions of persistence and the prohibitions against fission and fusion found in Wiggins. He is, in fact giving the conditions for re-identification. The condition that M-type causal chains do not branch added to remembering$_w$ is nothing less than the previous awareness condition for remembering$_s$ couched in different terms.

I noted the triviality involved when Shoemaker made this concealed reference to remembering$_s$. It would not be important if he let it go at that, but he claims much more.

Immediately following the concealed characterization of remembering$_s$ he writes,

> Here we avoid the circularity that Butler and others thought to be involved in any attempt to give an account of personal identity, and of the criteria of personal identity, in terms of memory.[6]

I am willing to admit that he avoids the circularity, but only at the expense of accepting the triviality pointed out above. Shoemaker is not successful in avoiding the Butler objection, though the objection is subtly different from the usual form it takes.

Immediately after the above claim, which I have shown to be unjustified, Shoemaker makes, what seems to me, a very odd remark. He writes, with regard to whether the weak or the strong sense of remember is used in ordinary discourse,

> It is possible that this question has no answer; since branching of M-type causal chains does not occur, and seldom envisaged, people have no practical motive for distinguishing between the strong and the weak sense of "remember".[7]

I think that it is important that question has an answer. First, can a question which has no answer be asked? Second, if the question has no answer then the concept of memory is a very vague concept indeed. Shoemaker compounds his suggestion of vagueness by saying,

> We can defend the spirit of the claim that memory is a criterion of personal identity without settling this question, although in order to defend the letter of that claim we must maintain that in its ordinary use "remember" means "remember$_w$."[8]

I do not understand the distinction between the spirit of the claim and the letter of the claim. I think that Shoemaker has got himself into difficulties here and is using some very dubious remarks to cover the confusion which his difficulties generate.

I argue in the final chapter that the ordinary use of "remember" is "remember$_w$". I see nothing but confusion following the introduction of a strong sense. Remember$_w$ is capable of fulfilling the conceptual tasks required of it.

II

Shoemaker tries to retain the contention that self-identification is immune to misidentification. Assuming the strong logical position, if a person remembers an experience then that person must be the same person as the experiencer, there is no other possibility. The rememberer is immune to misidentification. This is clearly de jure, then there is no possibility of a mistake.

Once the possibility of remembering$_w$ is allowed then the logical guarantee disappears. There always has to be a check to see if the rememberer is the same person as the experiencer. No matter how remote the possibility is, there is the chance of a mistake being made in self-identification. Any immunity here could not be de jure.

I know of no single instance where anyone has made a mistake in self-identity, but this does not show that such a mistake is impossible. Similarly I know of no one who has had chicken pox twice, but it is not impossible that someone has. The immunity from chicken pox is de facto immunity. The immunity from misidentification, when remembering$_w$ is allowed, is also de facto.

What sort of immunity is there in remembering$_s$? This is an important question for Shoemaker is right when he claims that in the world as we know it every case of remembering is such that the rememberer and the experiencer are one and the same person. He allows the possibility of remembering$_w$. So initially all immunity is de facto. The question now is "Does the immunity become de jure when the memory becomes remembering$_s$, i.e., when it becomes known that the rememberer and the experiencer are the same person?

The answer to the question is that the immunity does become de jure. The reason for this is simple. Once one has established that the rememberer and the experiencer are the same person, and one has to do this to ascertain that it is a case of remembering$_s$, then it is no great surprise that the rememberer cannot make a mistake when identifying himself as the experiencer. The immunity here is, of course, quite trivial. It consists of no more than saying that once one has established self-identity then one cannot be making a mistake in repeating the identification.

It takes nothing away from this de jure immunity to note that a mistake was possible earlier in the proceedings, before the remembering$_s$ was established. To point out that perhaps one could always be mistaken is to miss the point. If one is mistaken then there never was a case of

remembering$_S$ anyway.

De facto immunity is discussed in the last chapter. I have established that it is the only sense of immunity open to Shoemaker in any useful way, but it seems that he is not content to settle for de facto immunity. To see this we have to look at the previously mentioned last paragraph of "Persons and Their Pasts" where he writes that because remembering$_W$ is always remembering$_S$ there is special access as characterized in Sect. I. In Sect. I special access was characterized by de jure immunity and the strong previous awareness condition. I have made the point about immunity and so I leave it until I discuss special access in the next section of this chapter.

In Chapter IV I discussed, briefly, the notion of misidentification. I now discuss some more points Shoemaker makes about misidentification. I am not quite clear as to how we are supposed to receive these points. It seems that Shoemaker is attempting to persuade us that immunity to misidentification in first person instances when there is the possibility of remembering$_W$ has much in common with the de jure immunity associated with the strong logical position.

He first makes the distinction between misidentification in first person reports and misidentification in third person reports. This is the point mentioned in Chapter IV. He then argues that misidentification in instances of first person remembering$_W$ is radically unlike the sense which he has distinguished in third person reports such as, "John shouted that Johnson should be impeached". There certainly is a radical unlikeness, but whether or not the unlikeness is what Shoemaker requires is far from

clear. I argue that it is not what he needs. He writes,

> But a misidentification on this basis (first person remembering), while basically possible, would be radically unlike the misidentification that actually occurs in the making of third person reports.[9]

The first sort of immunity is that under the strong sense of "remember" in first person reports. There if the memory reports are veridical it is not possible to misidentify the experiencer for he must be oneself. Immunity is de jure. In the second instance there is no immunity for, under third person reports, it is quite possible, and often happens, that mistakes can be made over identification even when the memory reports are veridical. The mistake can be made at the moment of observation.

Shoemaker then produces the case where it is basically possible to misidentify, the case of remembering$_w$. He claims it is radically different from misidentification in third person reports. This is true, but of little interest to us in the present discussion. The important distinction is between those cases where there is no possiblity of misidentification and those cases where there is such a possibility. This is the distinction between those cases with de jure immunity and de facto immunity. Looking at the distinction this way then third person reports and remembering$_w$ should be grouped together and distinguished from the strong sense of remembering.

Shoemaker is not clear about his intention here, but he seems to be suggesting that first person remembering in the strong sense should be grouped with first person remembering$_w$ and distinguished from third person reports. As I have pointed out the grouping is tenable, but of no use to Shoemaker in his arguments.

III

I come to the last of the three points, the question of special access. In the last paragraph of "Persons and Their Pasts" Shoemaker claims there is special access in the strong sense characterized by the strong previous awareness condition and the de jure sense of immunity.

I have argued above that if we permit the remembering$_w$ the most that can be claimed is de facto immunity. There is the trivial sense of de jure immunity, but it is unimportant. If Shoemaker based his claim for special access on the trivial sense then the claim would be trivial also. In other words, if one has shown that the rememberer and the experiencer are the same person then the rememberer has special access to his own past and his own identity - it has just been shown that past is his. This is neither surprising nor interesting.

On the other hand Shoemaker might be claiming something quite different. He may be claiming the de jure sense of immunity associated with the strong logical claim. It should not be forgotten that he claims the strong sense of special access found in Sect. I and that was before he had introduced remembering$_w$. By admitting that remembering$_w$ is possible Shoemaker gives up the strong logical position, so it is difficult to see how he could revert to such a claim in the final paragraph.

I think that Shoemaker is under the illusion that if the strong previous awareness condition is satisfied he is entitled to make a stronger claim than he can support. To make a claim for special access, in the strong sense, is either to make a trivial, but true, claim or an unjustifiably

strong claim. All he can claim is that a person has access to a past and an identity which is very likely to be his own. The immunity to mistake is de facto immunity of a very high order, there are no known instances of mistake, but this is very different from claiming that there could not possibly be a mistake and this is what Shoemaker wants.

Discussion in the above three sections show that Shoemaker has insurmountable problems in trying to juggle the concepts dealt with in those sections. In the next chapter I set out an analysis of the relationship between memory and identity which seems to be more practical than Shoemaker's dual senses of remembering. It will be neccessary to give up claims to special access and de jure immunity, but Butler's objection is avoided satisfactorily.

FOOTNOTES

1 Shoemaker, "Persons", p. 281

2 Ibid., p. 281

3 Ibid., p. 281

4 Wiggins, Identity, p. 27-40 inc.*

5 Ibid., p. 27-40 inc.

6 Shoemaker, "Identity", p. 281

7 Ibid., p. 281

8 Ibid., P. 281

9 Ibid., p. 284

* Wiggins gives more conditions than those mentioned in my discussion. I think Shoemaker considered them as being fulfilled. I do the same otherwise the discussion would be extremely long. A full consideration of the conditions is to be found in Wiggin's book.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Up to this point I have shown that the strong, logical position is not tenable. There is little disagreement about this. We have seen Sidney Shoemaker, who had been one of the proponents of the strong logical position change his mind and admit that there is the possibility of a sense of "remember" in which there is no requirement that the rememberer and the experiencer are one and the same person.

However Shoemaker wanted to accommodate three notions. First, he wanted to avoid Butler's objection; second, he wanted to retain immunity to misidentification; third, he wanted to retain special access to one's own past and identity. To accommodate all these at the same time he introduced as dual sense of "remembering" viz., remembering$_s$ and remembering$_w$. I have argued in the previous chapter that the introduction of this dual sense engendered confusion. It seemed that Butler's objection was not avoided, the sense of immunity was not clarified though he did claim he qualified it to de facto immunity and either he had strong special access in a trivial sense or he was not justified in claiming any sort of special access.

I intend now to offer an analysis of the relationship between memory and identity which is more reasonable than that offered by Shoemaker. I shall not try to accommodate the three notions as Shoemaker did. My objection to attempting this is a methodological one. I think conceptual analysis should be approached with as few preconceptions as possible and with aim of evaluating the philosophical concepts related to the area in

which the analysis is being undertaken.

We have seen if it is assumed that, for any genuine case of remembering, the rememberer must be the same person as he who experienced what is remembered, Butler's objection seems insurmountable. The work of David Wiggins' suggests that perhaps there is no such necessary identity between rememberer and experiencer in cases which we would wish to call genuine cases of remembering. The mistake which is made by the proponents of the necessary relation of identity is that they think the continuity required by genuine cases of memory is continuity of personal identity. Wiggin's dual transplant cases indicate that this is not so. For him the continuity of an equishphere would satisfy the requirement of a genuine case of remembering. Mere continuity of an equisphere would not guarantee personal identity. It is one of the requirements, a necessary requirement, but it is not sufficient. The futher requirements that no fusion nor fission had taken place would also have to be satisfied. (Wiggins has nine other requirements, but for the sake of simplicity I shall ignore them).

My suggestion is that we accept that memory and identity are separate concepts which are not necessarily related. They can be established separately. For instance, although memory is by far the most common fact used to establish continuity in personal identity, it is not necessary. The continuity is necessary, but the memory is not. There can be continuity of person and yet lapses in memory. Complete amnesia would be an instance of this. Other functions of a human being can replace memory in cases of amnesia.

It is very simple analysis which I have just offered - memory and identity are not logically related. Because I have concentrated much attention on Butler's objection, immunity to misidentification and special access in this thesis, I shall now look at these three in the light of the simple analysis.

Shoemaker was right when he noted that remembering$_w$ was not open to Butler's objection. Shoemaker ran into problems when he attempted to build up the stronger notion, remembering$_s$. I do not think there is such a strong notion. Our ordinary sense of remembering is remembering$_w$. As there is no requirement of identity of the rememberer and the experiencer Butler's objection cannot get started.

The conceptual separation of memory and personal identity in no way denies the plain fact that, in our world, the two occur. I have now wish to challenge this well established fact. To think that because the two constantly co-occur, they are therefore logically related, is to make a mistake. Constant co-occurrence and logical relationships are two quite distinct notions and simply should not be confused.

The above leads directly to the issue of immunity to misidentification in first person reports. Because there is no necessary relation of identity between the rememberer and the experiencer <u>de jure</u> immunity is a chimera in first person reports. However, because the co-occurrence is so constant, I know of no counter instance, we are sure that in cases of veridical first person reports we do not misidentify the experiencer when we identify him as ourself. The feeling of security is not due to any logical reason, it is not logical surety, but is due entirely to the very high level of con-

stancy of co-occurrence. The immunity is de facto immunity of a very high order. I have no objection to this sort of immunity, it is de jure immunity I object to.

I shall now move on to the related subject of special access. According to the special access theory if one had a veridical memory then one had direct access to one's own past history and one's own identity. Shoemaker wants to defend this notion in its strong sense as characterized by, at least, the strong previous awareness condition and de jure immunity to misidentification. Once the single weak sense of "remember" is assumed, as I have done, and this sense carries with no implication that the rememberer and the experiencer must be one and the same person, then only the de facto sense of immunity is allowed and there is no sense to correspond to the satisfaction of the strong previous awareness condition. This amounts to giving up the notion of special access in the strong sense. This does not involve giving up the notion that in cases of veridical memory we are very sure that it is our own past history we are remembering and the experiencer was ourself. One is simply giving up the logical certainty, and substituting for it the surety which comes from the constant co-occurrence of memory and personal identity of the rememberer and the experiencer.

So in accepting a single, weak sense of "remember" one can avoid Butler's objection, and enjoy de facto immunity to misidentification in instances of self-identification and have access to one's own past and identity which is based the constant co-occurrence of memory and personal

identity, but not on any sort of logical certainty. This seems to me to be a reasonable position. Shoemaker's first position, on the other hand, was clearly untenable as he himself recognized and his second is so confused as to be virtually useless.

I wish to make one more remark of a fairly general nature by way of concluding this dissertation. I think one of the underlying notions behind Shoemaker's work on personal identity is the idea that personal identity is distinct from other sorts of identity e.g., identity of material objects other than persons. The notion that the identity of persons, and especially self-identity, is uniquely distinct is based on de jure immunity and special access. It led Shoemaker to claim in Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity that self-identity is non-criterial. The idea that personal identity is unique is mistaken, I think. My analysis of the relationship between memory and personal identity is no less than an attempt to demonstrate this by showing that de jure immunity and special access are chimerae. Personal identity is essentially the same as other sorts of identity. It is subject to the satisfaction of the same conditions. One cannot, in theory dispense with these conditions, though in actual fact, due to the constant co-occurrence of memory and personal identity we usually do. The main difference between personal identity and other types of identity, in particular self-identity, is how we gain access to the facts we use in seeing if the conditions of identity are satisfied. We often use introspection to obtain the information whereas in the instances of re-identifying balls of clay we look at them as we look at any other external object.

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